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SUMMARY 
The purpose of this research was to conduct an economic analysis 
of a relatively new concept in quality control, price adjusting sampling 
plans. This concept eliminates the traditional idea of rejecting bad 
lots and substitutes therefore a scheme whereby a certain price is paid 
for each good item and nothing is paid for a defective item. The price 
paid for the total lot is based on the estimated lot fraction defective 
and a consumer indifference curve. As the lot fraction defective in­
creases, the amount the consumer pays for the lot decreases in such a 
fashion that he is indifferent to the quality of the lot. 
This thesis concludes that although existing price adjusting plans 
are single sample plans, it is not possible to derive economic benefits 
from the application of sequential analysis to the problem of determin­
ing how large a sample should be taken and how much should be paid for 
the lot since the basic problem is one of parameter estimation and not 
hypothesis testing. Sequential analysis is simply not applicable to this 
type of problem. 
To reassure the risk-averse producer and/or consumer who might 
be reluctant to employ a price adjusting scheme, this research produced 
a technique for determining an interval for the most likely value for 
the actual price paid for each good unit. The actual price paid per 
good unit will vary depending on how accurately the estimated lot 
fraction defective approximates the true lot fraction defective. 
Because there is a risk of economic loss to the producer and 
viii 
consumer associated with parameter estimation, loss functions for both 
parties have been developed. These functions identify the magnitude 
and likelihood of a loss. Additionally, should a plan be selected which 
protects the producer against a predetermined loss, the economic impact 
of this plan on the consumer is analyzed. 
By varying the slope of the consumer indifference curve, this 
research shows that the consumer can increase both the incentive for 
good quality and the penalty for bad. 
Finally, some practical suggestions are offered regarding the 
implementation of a price adjusting sampling plan. 
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C H A P T E R I 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
T R A D I T I O N A L L Y , T H E E X A C T P R I C E O F A L O T , O R B A T C H , O F M A N U ­
F A C T U R E D G O O D S I S T H E R E S U L T O F A N A G R E E M E N T B E T W E E N T H E P R O D U C E R A N D 
T H E C O N S U M E R R E A C H E D M O S T O F T E N P R I O R T O T H E A C T U A L S H I P M E N T O F T H E 
G O O D S . A T S O M E P O I N T P R I O R T O A C C E P T I N G T H E L O T , T H E C O N S U M E R W I L L M O S T 
L I K E L Y P E R F O R M S O M E T Y P E O F A C C E P T A N C E I N S P E C T I O N . I F T H E Q U A L I T Y I S 
G O O D , T H E L O T W I L L B E A C C E P T E D ; O T H E R W I S E , I T W I L L B E R E J E C T E D . W H E N 
A L O T I S R E J E C T E D , T H E P R O D U C E R ' S P R O F I T S W I L L B E D I M I N I S H E D B Y T H E A D D I ­
T I O N A L S H I P P I N G A N D M A N U F A C T U R I N G C O S T S N E C E S S A R Y T O I M P R O V E T H E Q U A L I T Y 
O F T H E L O T . I N V O L V E D A R E R O U N D T R I P T R A N S P O R T A T I O N C O S T S , U N P A C K I N G A N D 
R E P A C K I N G , A N D T H E A C T U A L C O S T O F I D E N T I F Y I N G A N D R E W O R K I N G T H E D E F E C ­
T I V E I T E M S . U L T I M A T E L Y , T H E S E C O S T S M U S T B E P A S S E D O N T O T H E C O N S U M E R 
I F T H E P R O D U C E R I S T O R E M A I N I N B U S I N E S S . 
A L L O F T H E A D D I T I O N A L C O S T S T H A T R E S U L T F R O M T H E R E J E C T I O N O F A 
L O T C A N B E A V O I D E D I F I N S T E A D O F R E J E C T I N G L O T S O F P O O R Q U A L I T Y , A L L 
L O T S A R E A C C E P T E D A T A V A R I A B L E P R I C E D E P E N D I N G O N T H E L O T F R A C T I O N 
D E F E C T I V E . T H I S C O N C E P T , I N T R O D U C E D B Y F O S T E R (12), I S B A S E D U P O N T H E 
A S S U M P T I O N T H A T T H E C O N S U M E R C A N D E V E L O P A N I N D I F F E R E N C E C U R V E W H I C H W I L L 
R E L A T E T H E P R I C E H E I S W I L L I N G T O P A Y F O R A P A R T I C U L A R L O T T O T H E Q U A L I T Y 
O F T H A T L O T , W H E R E Q U A L I T Y I S M E A S U R E D I N T E R M S O F L O T F R A C T I O N D E F E C T I V E . 
U N I T P R I C E I S D I V I D E D I N T O T W O C A T E G O R I E S ; P D O L L A R S A R E P A I D F O R 
E A C H G O O D I T E M A N D Z E R O D O L L A R S A R E P A I D F O R E A C H D E F E C T I V E I T E M . 
B E C A U S E T H E A C T U A L N U M B E R O F G O O D U N I T S I N A P A R T I C U L A R L O T I S N O T K N O W N 
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A P R I O R I , T H A T Q U A N T I T Y I S E S T I M A T E D B A S E D U P O N T H E N U M B E R O F D E F E C ­
T I V E S F O U N D I N T H E S A M P L E I N S P E C T E D . T H E P R E C I S E N U M B E R O F D E F E C T I V E S 
C O U L D B E D E T E R M I N E D B Y I N S P E C T I N G T H E E N T I R E L O T B U T I N M O S T C A S E S T H A T 
W O U L D B E P R O H I B I T I V E L Y E X P E N S I V E . 
T H E P U R P O S E O F T H I S T H E S I S I S T O C O N D U C T A N E C O N O M I C A N A L Y S I S O F 
T H E P R I C E A D J U S T I N G S A M P L I N G P L A N S D E V E L O P E D B Y F O S T E R . F I R S T , S I N C E 
F O S T E R ' S P L A N S A R E S I N G L E S A M P L I N G P L A N S , I N T U I T I O N S U G G E S T S T H A T 
S A V I N G S C O U L D A C C R U E F R O M U S I N G S E Q U E N T I A L S A M P L I N G T E C H N I Q U E S T O R E D U C E 
T H E A V E R A G E N U M B E R O F I T E M S S A M P L E D . T H I S T H E S I S W I L L S H O W T H A T I T E M -
B Y - I T E M S E Q U E N T I A L S A M P L I N G I S N O T A P P R O P R I A T E F O R U S E W I T H F O S T E R ' S 
P R I C E A D J U S T I N G P L A N S . 
S E C O N D , T H I S T H E S I S W I L L D E V E L O P L I M I T S F O R T H E M O S T L I K E L Y 
V A L U E O F T H E A C T U A L P R I C E P A I D B Y T H E C O N S U M E R F O R E A C H G O O D I T E M . 
E C O N O M I C L O S S F U N C T I O N S W I L L A L S O B E D E V E L O P E D W H I C H W I L L I N D I C A T E T O 
T H E P R O D U C E R A N D T H E C O N S U M E R T H E M A G N I T U D E O F A P O T E N T I A L L O S S A N D T H E 
R I S K A S S O C I A T E D T H E R E W I T H . A R E L A T E D T E C H N I Q U E W I L L B E D E V E L O P E D W H E R E B Y 




From 1929, when the first acceptance sampling plan was published 
by H. F. Dodge and H. G. Romig of Bell Telephone Laboratories, until 
the present, acceptance sampling has been used to determine whether a 
lot of manufactured goods should be accepted or rejected. A typical 
attributes sampling plan stipulates that the consumer randomly select a 
sample of size n from the lot in question and accept the lot if the 
number of defectives is less than or equal to some number c < n and 
reject the lot if the number of defective items is greater than c. All 
of the sampling plans developed since 1929, double, multiple, sequential, 
chain sampling, etc. have been developed to assist in making the decision 
to accept or reject a lot of goods. The differences among the plans are 
the ability to discriminate between good and bad quality, the sample 
size necessary to accomplish that discrimination, and the ease of admin­
istration. 
During World War II, the concept of acceptance sampling was 
extended to include incentives which would encourage the production of 
good quality. Although the Army Ordnance Sampling Tables, developed in 
1942, did not provide for the payment of economic rewards to the pro­
ducer when he submitted lots of good quality, they did penalize the pro­
ducer when lots of substandard quality were submitted. Specifically, 
the producer was assured that so long as he maintained the lot fraction 
defective at or below a prescribed level, the Acceptable Quality Level 
4 
or AQL, his lots would be accepted a high percentage of the time. How­
ever, should the fraction defective exceed the specified limit by a 
statistically significant amount, the incoming lots would be subjected 
to more stringent inspection, resulting in a higher rejection rate. 
Conversely, if the quality was consistently better than the AQL by a sig­
nificant amount, the inspection criteria would be reduced; i.e., it 
would be more permissive. The rules for switching back and forth among 
the three plans, normal, tightened and reduced, provided an incentive to 
the vendor to insure that the quality of lots produced was maintained at 
better than the acceptable level. 
Only within about the last ten years has any thought been given 
to using the results of acceptance sampling as a basis for determining 
an economic reward to be paid directly to the producer. Hill (15) in 
1960, discusses the idea of developing economic incentives which would 
encourage the production of good quality. Certainly, the prospect of 
having a lot of bad quality rejected is in itself an incentive, but Hill 
points out that acceptance sampling does little to change the quality 
of goods received by the consumer. The level of quality depends 
directly on the producer's process curve, or the prior distribution of 
lot fraction defective, and to change that curve to reflect a higher level 
of quality requires that the producer be offered some economic incentive 
to do so. In his discussion, Hill illustrates his point using a single 
sampling plan, but he does not discuss the effect that the Military 
Standard 105 series of acceptance sampling plans has on the producer's 
process curve. The MIL-STD-105 plans evolved from the World War II Army 
Ordnance Tables, Navy Tables of the same vintage, and efforts of an 
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A-nerican-British-Canadian Working Group that sought to derive a common 
standard for the three countries. 
In 1964 Flehinger and Miller (ll) developed a scheme for incen­
tive contracts based on the assumption that some specific level of 
quality will be optimum for both the consumer and the producer. If 
the agreed upon level of quality is met, as determined by an acceptance 
test, then a premium is paid to the producer. 
The approach used by Flehinger and Miller is the simultaneous 
minimization of the producer's and the consumer's loss functions which 
are dependent upon the fraction defective and the particular acceptance 
test parameters. The premium paid to the producer is determined by nego­
tiation; the minimum value is the amount the producer must invest to 
achieve the optimal level of quality. The maximum value is the amount 
the consumer profits by getting improved quality. This arrangement per­
mits both producer and consumer to profit, assuming, of course, that 
the cost to the producer of improved quality is less than the benefit to 
the consumer. 
In 1966, Durbin (10) developed a pricing scheme somewhat similar 
to that proposed by Flehinger and Miller. The basic difference is that 
with Durbin's plan instead of the consumer paying a premium if quality 
is good, the consumer pays a unit price q>(x) based on x, the number of 
defectives found in a single sample of size n. As with the Flehinger and 
Miller approach, expressions are developed for consumer and producer 
profit. Durbin describes the situation as a constrained, two person 
non-zero-sum game where the producer can control p the fraction defective 
-nd the consumer can prescribe n the sample size. It is assumed that the 
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producer can state the minimum unit price, w, which he desires assurance 
of receiving if true quality is as good as p*. Since even with accept­
able quality (p < p*) any batch may yield a sample containing a dispro­
portionately high number of defectives, the producer will accept a con­
tingent pricing policy which given n and p < p*, promises payment less 
than w with frequency less than some specified a. Similarly, it is 
assumed that the consumer can state v, the maximum unit price he is 
willing to pay when quality is as poor as p^ > p* and 0, the relative 
frequency with which overpayment will be permissible. 
The model is formulated as a linear programming problem where 
the consumer seeks to maximize his expected profit by choosing n and 
<p(x) knowing that the producer will choose the fraction defective, p, 
that will maximize his profit. The constraints are the upper and lower 
bounds on the pricing policy described above. 
In 1967, Roeloffs (16) recognized that most sampling plans 
penalize the producer when process quality decreases from an accept­
able level, but do not reward the producer for improving the quality 
beyond the acceptable level. He points out that the economic benefit 
of quality improvement beyond the acceptable level accrues to the con­
sumer, while the cost of such improvement must be borne by the producer. 
The producer has no incentive to expend resources to improve the process 
beyond the acceptable level, but the consumer, on the other hand, would 
benefit from process improvement beyond the acceptable level. Roeloffs 
proposes a Price Differential Sampling Plan (PDSP) which would adjust the 
price paid for a lot according to the fraction defective observed in the 
sample drawn from the lot. 
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As with most single sampling plans, the PDSP identifies in the 
usual manner a sample size n and an acceptance number c. Roeloffs then 
develops a schedule of prices (in terms of price per unit) to be paid 
for the lot assuming that the number of defectives in the lot does not 
exceed c, the acceptance number. 
A typical schedule of prices is 
Defectives in Sample 
as shown below, 
Action 
0 Accept lot; unit price 
1 Accept lot; unit price - "i 
i Accept lot; unit price " q i 
c Accept lot; unit price 
> c Reject lot 
The value of is determined by the consumer and is the maxi­
mum price he would be willing to pay for entirely defect-free product. 
The values of q^, where i » 1,2,...,c, are based on a linear decreasing 
function of i and have values such that if quality merely remains at 
the acceptable level, the expected price will be the price that would 
be paid under a conventional fixed price acceptance sampling plan. 
In 1970 Foster (12) introduced the concept of price adjusting 
sampling plans (PASP), which eliminate the costly rejection process. 
All lots are accepted and are priced based upon the number of defectives 
found in the sample and the consumer indifference curve. The first step 
in Foster's plan is to establish through negotiation a value for P, the 
price per good unit. Then the consumer must develop his indifference 
8 




Figure 1. Consumer Indifference Curve. 
where p 1 is the true lot fraction defective and N is the lot size. To 
protect himself against a severe loss that might result if a small sample 
was used to estimate p', the producer stipulates that if the true lot 
fraction defective is at some value p^, the probability that the price 
per non-defective unit be less than some lower limit L, should be less 
than or equal to some predetermined value a. This stipulation prescribes 
a value for n which can be evaluated since Foster assumes that the ratio 
n/N is sufficiently small such that the binomial distribution closely 
approximates the hypergeometric distribution. After the sample is 
inspected and x, the number of defectives, is identified, the total price 
paid for the lot, based on the indifference curve shown in Figure 1 is 
PTotal ' N P ( 1 - ^ 
In 1972 Foster and Perry (13) developed the concept of a price 
adjusting single sampling (PASS) plan which in essence is a more detailed 
discussion of Foster's earlier work. The second paper includes tables 
9 
which greatly reduce the difficulty of determining the proper sample 
si ze. 
Paralleling the evolution of economic incentives as an integral 
part of an acceptance sampling plan was the development of interest in 
item-by-item sequential sampling. This concept was first devised by 
Abraham Wald in April, 1943 while he was associated with the Statistical 
Research Group, Columbia University and was initially described in a 
classified government report entitled, "Sequential Analysis of Statistical 
Data; Theory." This report was submitted by the Statistical Research 
Group to the Applied Mathematics Panel, National Defense Research Com­
mittee, September, 1943. Subsequently, the material was declassified and 
published by Wald in June, 1945, in the Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 
and again in September, 1945 as a series of reports entitled "Sequential 
Analysis of Statistical Data," published by Columbia University. Finally, 
in 1947, Wald published his classic text, entitled Sequential Analysis. 
To quote Wald (19), "By a sequential test of a statistical hypothe­
sis is meant any statistical test procedure which gives a specific rule, 
at any stage of the experiment (at the n**1 trial for each integral value 
of n), for making one of the following three decisions! (l) to accept 
the hypothesis being tested (null hypothesis), (2) to reject the null 
hypothesis, (3) to continue the experiment by making an additional obser­
vation. Thus, such a test procedure is carried out sequentially. On 
the basis of the first trial, one of the three decisions mentioned above 
is made. If the first or the second decision is made, the process is 
terminated. If the third decision is made, a second trial is performed. 
Again on the basis of the first two trials one of the three decisions is 
made and if the third decision is reached a third trial is performed, 
1 0 
etc. This process is continued until either the first or the second 
decision is made." 
In summary, there has been a trend over the past thirty years 
away from the idea of merely penalizing the producer for bad quality and 
toward the concept of encouraging good quality through the use of monetary 
rewards. Foster introduced the idea of accepting all lots at a price 
dependent on the number of defectives found in the sample inspected. 
However, no attempt has been made to date to link the merits of a plan 




REVIEW OF PASP AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that although the 
conventional item-by-item sequential sampling plan developed by Wald is 
much more efficient than a convential single sampling plan, a parallel 
situation does not exist when one tries to develop a sequential sampling 
plan with price adjusting. Intuition would lead one to believe that a 
sequential sampling plan could be developed and that the expected num­
ber of observations would be much less than the number required for a 
price adjusting single sampling (PASS) plan. Such is not the case. 
The Concept of Price Adjusting Sampling Plans (PASP) 
As developed by Foster (12), the concept of price adjusting 
sampling plans (PASP) is unique in that it eliminates the usual purpose 
of sampling inspection, namely, to determine if a lot should be accepted 
or rejected. All lots are accepted with the price paid for the lot being 
a function of x, the number of defectives found in a sample of size n. 
As was mentioned earlier, the total price paid for a lot of N 
items will depend upon the quality of the sample. If the sample con­
tains no defectives, a maximum price, NP, will be paid for the lot 
where P is a price per good unit. P dollars are paid for each good unit 
and zero dollars for each defective. The value P is a fixed amount and 
is agreed upon by the producer and the consumer during contract negotia­
tions. 
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If the quality of the lot is not perfect, that is, the true lot 
fraction defective p' is greater than zero, then the price paid for the 
lot should be reduced by some amount Ng(x). The expression for total 
price of the lot then becomes, 
(1) P T o t a l - H[P - g(x)] 
In order for such a plan to work, the consumer must be indif­
ferent to quality. That is, he must pay an amount for each lot such 
that as quality varies, from p' * 0 to p 1 * 1.0, he is not concerned 
because the price paid for the lot decreases in a manner acceptable to 
him. 
An ideal consumer indifference curve for a lot of size N might 
look like that shown in Figure 2. 
Lot Price 
NP \ 
Figure 2. Consumer's Ideal Indifference Curve. 
The interpretation of this curve is as follows. If the quality 
is perfect, he is willing to pay NP for the lot. However, as p 1 
increases, the problem of screening out the defectives changes from an 
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occasional annoyance to a slowdown in production. The price paid for a 
bad lot will have to be considerably less than the price paid for a good 
lot in order to offset the problems encountered in the manufacturing 
process resulting from having received a large number of defective 
items, especially if the defectives are not identified until late in 
the manufacturing process. 
The producer, however, takes a different viewpoint. In order to 
protect his profit margin, and indeed the survival of his enterprise, he 
would like to sell his product using the price adjusting scheme only if 
the indifference curve is of the form shown in Figure 3. 
Lot Price 
i p . 
Figure 3. Producer's Ideal Indifference Curve. 
Since neither of the two curves shown in Figures 2 and 3 is 
acceptable to both parties, a compromise will be made. A linear indif­




Li /V)C F 5 
Ideal 
Figure 4. Linear Indifference Curve. 
The meaning of this curve is that the consumer, for example is 
indifferent to quality on the condition that the lot price is determined 
by the relationship, 
(2) LOT PRICE * NP(1 - p 4) 
This means that as p' increases Lot Price decreases linearly until 
p* - 1.0. 
The linear indifference curve could be of the form 
LOT PRICE 
NP(l - p'/a) 0 < p* < a 
otherwise 
which means that the consumer is unwilling to pay anything for the lot 
when p' a, but this will be treated as a separate problem in Chapter V . 
Referring to Equation (l), we see that P j o t a ^ *-s * n expression 
for lot price that is dependent upon x the number of defectives in the 
sample. To review the discussion found in Foster and Perry (13), the 
expression for P j 0 ^ a ^ s n o u l d be acceptable to the consumer if the expected 
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value of the amount the consumer will pay, ^j0^a^t i s equal to LOT PRICE, 
the indifference curve relating dollars to the true lot fraction defec­
tive. That is, if over the long run the consumer can expect that the 
amount he gets based on the results of sampling will equal the amount 
that he would like to receive, LOT PRICE, That is, if 
(3) ££ PTotal ] * L 0 T P R I C E 
then the consumer will be indifferent to the quality he receives. 
Thus, 
(4) Ef PTotal ] " E f N P " N g W ] " N P ( 1 " P') 
NP - NE[g(x)] * NP - NP(p f) 
E[g(x)] - P(p') 
Assuming that g(x) is linear and of the form 
g(x) « dx where d is a constant 
we find that 
(5) E[g(x)] » dE[x] - dnp' 
substituting (5) into (4) yields 
dnp' - P(p') 
or. 
d « P/n 
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Since the expression for g(x) • dx has been evaluated as 
g(x) * P/n # x 
Equation (l) becomes, 
(6) P T o t a l - N[P - g(x)] - N[P - P/n •x] 
Factoring out P, (6) becomes 
(7) P T o t a l - NP[1 - x/n] 
Protecting the Producer 
In order for the pricing scheme outlined in the preceding sec­
tion to be acceptable to the producer, he must have certain assurances 
that p represents a good estimate of p', the true lot fraction defective. 
If p > p 1 , the producer will sell the lot for less than it is worth, but 
if p*< p*, he will reap additional profit. His main concern is to guard 
against a loss. Hence, once P, the theoretical price per good unit is 
identified, the actual price per good unit should be determined. 
Actual cost per m Total price paid for the lot 
good unit Total No. of good units actually in the lot 
, N P U - x/n) 
N(l - p') 
r v 1 - p w 
Call this expression C, that is, 
c - H^f^t) 
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Since C is a random variable whose actual value depends on how accu­
rately x/n estimates p', the producer will want to specify a lower limit, 
L for C when quality is good, i.e., p' < p^. Such a specification will 
reduce the magnitude and frequency of a loss which would result when a 
random sample contains a disproportionately high number of defectives. 
The expression which represents producer protection is, 
(9) P r j c < L|p« < pjj < a 
where a is some small value such as 0.05 or 0.10. 
Example 
The following example illustrates the application of a PASS plan. 
Suppose that in the past the consumer has been paying $0.20 per 
item and that each lot has had an average per cent defective of 4%. To 
arrive at a value for P, the price per good item, we write 
p K Total price paid for each lot in the past 
Total actual good items in each lot 
Let us assume that the producer wants to be very sure that he 
doesn't suffer a severe loss by adopting this type of plan so he chooses 
a value of L « $0.18 that is only 10% less than he used to receive for 
items that were defective 4% of the time. He wants to be assured of 
getting at least $0.18, 99% of the time. Referring to Equation (9) this 
means that 
L « SO.18 and 
a « 0.01 
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Substituting Equation (8) into (9) gives 
do) f'y'^rz^ * L | p > * pi] s 0 
Equation (10) may be transformed by algebraic manipulation and 
by the substitution of p^ for p' to 
(11) Pr >. [1 " jr(l " Pi)]| < a 
Substituting the values of the parameters yields 
Pr jjx/n £ 0.17lj < 0.01 
Referring to the tables of the cumulative binomial probability 
distribution, for p* * 0.04 we see that a sample size of n * 18 is the 
smallest sample which will yield the desired protection. 
For n * 18, 
Pr |x £ (l8)(0.17l)j » Pr ĵx > 3.08j> 
Because x is discrete, this is equivalent to 
Pr £ 4J « 0.005 
Since 0.005 is smaller than 0.01, the producer is satisfied. 
The consumer is agreeable to this plan because he agreed to the indif­
ference curve which determined the payment schedule. 
To summarize the plan, it stipulates that a sample of 18 items 
be inspected, the number of defectives x, counted, and a payment of 
NP(l - x/n) be made to the producer. 
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f ( e ) 
L e u . 
Figure 5. Probability Distribution Function of 
Variable Cost Per Good Unit. 
The expected value of C is P, which occurs when x/n * p'j when 
x/n > p', C tends toward L and perhaps beyond. When x/n < p', then the 
price the consumer will have to pay tends toward U. 
Conceivably, the consumer and the producer might agree to develop 
a PASP plan to protect the consumer's interests. The consumer, for 
example, may have very reluctantly consented to a linear indifference 
curve rather than one of the type shown in Figure 2. To compensate for 
this concession the consumer may insist on high assurance that if quality 
Protecting the Consumer 
Not only is the producer concerned about the economic impact of 
arriving at a value of x/n which is a bad estimate of p', the true lot 
fraction defective, but the consumer has similar worries. If x/n < p', 
then the actual price per good item that he pays may be intolerable to 
him. Since C the actual cost per good unit is a random variable which 
depends on how accurately x/n estimates p', we might visualize the proba­
bility distribution function of C to look something like the following, 
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is bad, (p* * p^ > p^)» he won't be required to pay any more than some 
upper limit, U, (U > P) for each good unit actually in the lot. Specif­
ically, his requirement is as follows, 
(12) Pr j c < U |p' £ P^jl 1 - 0 
where 0 is some small value specified by the consumer. 
Substituting for C in Equation (8), Equation (12) becomes 
P r ( P ( 1 l " - p ^ n ) < U i p ' * P 2 j ^ 1 " * 
Setting p* equal to and rearranging terms, this becomes, 
(13) Pr^x/n > [1 - jf (1 - p 2 ) ] j > 1 - 0 
Mostly likely, the values of U, p, and p^ chosen by the consumer 
will not result in the same value of n as would be generated by a pro­
ducer protection plan as discussed in the previous section. The reason 
for this is that the plan to protect the consumer and the plan to protect 
the producer are two separate plans. The parameters U, L, p^, p 2 , a and 
0 are not common to both plans. One is concerned with x/n being greater 
than some quantity a low percentage of the time, whereas the other is 
concerned with x/n being greater than some other quantity a high percen­
tage of the time. 
Example 
To illustrate, the consumer protection plan, the example used to 
demonstrate a producer protection plan will be used. That is, P "10.2083. 
Assume further that the consumer specifies, 
21 U « $.25 
0 « 0.05 
p 2 « 0.08 
Evaluating Equation (13) using the above values leads to, 
Pr (x/n >[1 ' 0720%(1 " °-08)] ̂j1 ~0-05 
or 
Prj^x/n > 0.064J £ 0.95 
From the tables of the cumulative binomial probability distribu­
tion, a minimum value of n is found to be n * 36. Actually, 
Pr £ (36)(0.064)J » 0.95030 
The plan functions in a manner similar to the producer protec­
tion scheme, that is, take a sample of 36, count the number of defectives 
x and pay an amount equal to NP(l - x/n) for the lot. 
ftald's Sequential Analysis and Price Adjusting Sampling 
The purpose of conventional single sampling plans is to answer 
the following questions — for a given set of criteria, should a lot be 
accepted or rejected? The criteria are usually specified in the follow­
ing manner, 
(14) Pr ^Accept the lot | p* - p̂j £ 1 - a 
Pr / Accept the lot | p* * p^i < £ 
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Where and p^ represent good and bad quality respectively and a and 0 
have small values and p^ < p^. 
"Accept the lot" means mathematically that x the number of 
defectives in a sample of size n i 6 smaller than some value c. When 
p^, p^, a and p have been specified, n and c can be evaluated using the 
two expressions in (14), A conventional single sampling plan then works 
as follows. Take a sample of n items and count the number of defectives. 
If x < c accept the lot; if x > c reject it. 
Wald's item-by-item sequential sampling plan satisfies the require­
ments stipulated in (14) using a device that Wald terms a Sequential 
Probability Ratio (SPR). The meaning of the SPR can be more readily 
understood if the requirements of (14) are expressed in a more general, 
graphical form. The curve shown in Figure 6 is known as an operating 
characteristic (OC) curve. 
Prob. of 
Accepting 
the lot v 
This curve indicates that as p', the true fraction defective, 
varies from zero to one, the probability of accepting the hypothesis 
Figure 6. Operating Characteristic Curve 
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that the lot is good (and hence of accepting the lot) varies from one 
to zero. The two points specified by (14) determined the shape of the 
curve. 
The SPR is developed as follows. A null hypothesis H q is estab­
lished, and for an acceptance sampling plan this means the quality of 
the lot is good, i.e., p f * p.. The alternate hypothesis, H is that 
A a 
quality is bad, i.e., p* * p 2« To simplify the discussion, the SPR shall 
be defined as follows, 
(15) SPR - gjQ 
where, 
Pr (2) * probability of getting the results that have thus far been 
obtained, i.e., the specific number of defectives found after 
the n t h trial, if H the alternate hypothesis is true. 
If it can be assumed that x is binomially distributed, then 
Pr (2) can be expressed as 
Pr (2) « p 2 X(l - p 2 ) n " X 
Pr (l) - Probability of getting the results that have thus far been 
obtained, i.e., the specific number of defectives found after 
the n**1 trial, if H q the null hypothesis is true. 
If it can be assumed that x is binomially distributed, then Pr (l) can 
be expressed as 
P r ( 1 ) - p l x u - p l ) n " x 
Wald places boundaries on the SPR, and once the boundaries are 
exceeded as a result of a certain set. (x,n), then sampling stops 
because a decision has been reached. The decision rules are. 
where 
and 
Reject the lot if SPR > A 
Accept the lot if SPR < B 
Probability of rejection if H is true 
Probability of rejection if H is true ' o 
Probability of acceptance if is true 
Probability of acceptance if H q is true 
Thus the boundaries on the SPR become 
(16) 7 - - — < SPR < 
1 - a — - a 
This relationship can be more readily visualized if Figure 6 
redrawn with some added notation, 
fro\o o ̂ 
r'U lot 
ft = p r o b 
if- W 
Figure 7. Operating Characteristic Curve. 
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Wald (19) indicates that for the values of a and p most fre­
quently employed the sequential test results in an average saving of 
at least 47% in the necessary number of observations compared with a 
single sampling test. 
Because such significant savings are possible with sequential 
analysis, it is intuitively appealing to try to apply this same approach 
to Foster's price adjusting sampling plans. To evaluate the merit of 
such an idea, consider first the problem of developing a plan which pro­
tects the producer. 
To apply sequential analysis, two points on an operating charac­
teristic curve must be defined. Recalling the earlier discussion of 
Foster's producer protection plan, we note that only one point was used 
namely a point defined as follows. 
Pr |c < L | p* < p̂j < a 
The point is defined by (p^, a ) . The question that concerns the 
producer is the way the probability that C > L varies as p* varies. 
This is analogous in conventional sampling plans to the way the proba­
bility of accepting the lot varies as p' varies. Hence, a cost charac­
teristic curve can be developed which would be based on the following 
hypotheses. H q t p* * p^, H^ : p* * p^. The curve would appear as 
shown in Figure 8. 
We note that the second point defined by (p2> 6) does not involve 
the consumer and his interest in having C < U. The consumer's interest 
in being assured that C does not exceed the upper limit U would be 
treated as an entirely separate problem. 
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7' T± 
Figure 8. Producer's Cost Characteristic Curve. 
Referring once again to the producer's cost characteristic curve, 
the second point would enable the consumer to penalize the producer for 
bad quality. If 6 had a small value such as 0.05 or 0.10, then the pro­
ducer would be discouraged from producing bad quality because he would 
have little likelihood of receiving his minimum payment L if quality was 
bad. The second point (p^, 6) has the following probability statement 
associated with it, 
(17 ) Pr C > I | p ' - p 0 < e 
When quality is good, p* * p^, the producer has high assurance 
that C > L. 
Pr ĵ C > L | p' « p̂j > 1 -a 
The next step in developing a sequential sampling plan with 
price adjusting is to develop a sequential probability ratio. Follow­
ing the procedure developed by Wald, 
SPR Pr (2) 
P r i l T 
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where, 
Pr (2) « probability of getting a value of C > L 
if H f l is true (p* « p 2) 
Pr (l) * probability of getting a value of C > L 
if Hq is true (p 1 « p ^ 
Pr (2) can be evaluated as follows, 
(18) Pr (2) - Pr jc > L |p« * p2J 
Using the expression for C, Equation (8) this becomes, 
Pr (2) - Pr^P(fr̂ r) > I |p" - P2J 
Substituting p 2 for p* and rearranging terms, this becomes, 
Pr (2) - Pr £x/n < [l - (l -p2)]j 
Since the parameters L,P, and p 2 have predetermined values, we 
can set 
k 2 • [1 - £ (1 - p 2)] 
hence, 
(19) Pr(2) - Pr < x < k 2n 
Similarly, 
Pr(l) « Pr |c > L J p• - p|j 
which becomes 
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(20) Pr(l) • Pr( x < k 1n 
where 
^ - [l - £ (l - P l ) ] 
Now that the SPR has been evaluated as 
Pr(x < k 2n) 
(21) SPR Pr^* x < kjiV) 
the boundaries on the SPR must now be determined. Comparing Figures 
7 and 8 we see that the boundaries are. 
(22) _ 0 _ < P r ( X < k 2 n ) ' L i 
1 - a - p r ^ x < k x n ) ~ a 
Since it was assumed that x has a binomial probability distribu­
tion, (22) can be rewritten as, 
[k 2n] 
r> X/. xn-x 
L p 2 ( 1 - p 2 } 
(23) e < r £ £ _ < i " e 
1 - a ^ [k xn] - a 
L p i ( 1 " p i } 
x«0 
where [k 2n] means the largest integer contained within k 2n. 
An analysis of (23) reveals that the sequential probability 
ration depends in this case only on the value of n. All one has to do 
is to solve relationship (23) for n prior to any testing. Take that 
number of samples, count the number of defectives observed in the sample 
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and pay NP(l - x/n) for the lot. Hence, the techniques of sequential 
analysis do not apply to this type of problem. 
Looking back at Foster's single sampling plan, we can see in 
retrospect why sequential sampling does not apply. Foster's plan 
specifies only one point on an OC curve, (p^, 1 - a) and eventually 
only one variable n need be evaluated. 
Foster's plan specifies 
Since k^ can not be less than p^ (because both L/P and p^ are 
less than one) all that is required to insure that x/n < k^ is to find 
an n large enough to satisfy (24), 
In a conventional single sampling plan a reasonable set of 
stopping rules might be» 
a. Stop if the number of defectives exceeds c, 
the maximum allowable 
b. Or, assuming that x < c stop when n observations have 
been taken. 
with price adjusting sampling plans, the only stopping rule is 
stop when n observations have been taken. The number of defectives 
found after n observations is not a factor in the decision to stop the 
inspection procedure. 
which reduces to 
(24) 
where ^ * [l - f (l - P l ) ] 
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Before leaving the subject of sequential analysis, it might be 
interesting to look at Figure 8 again. 
Not only does the concept of sequential analysis not apply for 
the reasons outlined above, but the consumer can not effectively 
penalize the producer for submitting bad quality, p* m p 2 . Recalling 
Equation (17) 
Prj^C > L | p' « p 2 | < 6 
it is relatively easy to show that 6 can never have a value less than 
0,5, and that for common values of p 2 such as 0,20 or less, 0 is on the 
order of 0,80, Values of 0 which are not significantly smaller than 
(l - a) make the idea of a penalty almost meaningless. 
Now let us see why 0 can never be less than 0.5. For the 
binomial probability distribution, we know that, 
I[x] « np' 
which means, by definition of expected value that 
Pr j^x<np'-j « 0,5 
Referring to Expression (24) we see that 
Pr j c > lJ « Prfx/n < [ l - £ U - P * ) ] j 
- Pr Tx/n < kj where k « [l -^(l "P*)] 
In order for this expression to take on a small value such as 
0.05 or 0.10, which is on the order of what we would like 0 to be, kn 
will have to be smaller than np 1. This can be seen more readily from 
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the sketch of the binomial probability distribution shown in Figure 9. 
The sketch shows f(x) to be continuous for purposes of clarity of con­
cept, although it is actually discrete. 
fix) 
Figure 9. Binomial Probability Distribution 
We will show that this is not possible by assuming kn < np* and 
by showing that this leads to an impossible situation. 
kn < np* 
.\ k < p' 
1 - £ (1 - p«) < p' 
1 - p- + p - p ' < p ' 
(1 - < p . ( l . t) 
1 < p' 
The fraction defective can not be greater than one, hence, the 
assumption that kn < np 1 must be false. 
Barnard's Approach to Sequential Sampling 
A discussion of sequential sampling would not be complete without 
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briefly reviewing Barnard's method which was developed independent of 
Wald's efforts albeit at about the same time (1946). His method seems 
particularly appealing since it includes a double sided alternative 
hypothesis, a concept which sounds like it might accommodate the pro­
ducer and consumer protection problems simultaneously. Barnard's test 
determines whether a mean value is significantly more, significantly less 
or has experienced no important variation from a specified value. A test 
can be obtained by superimposing two single-sided tests. The procedure 
consists of plotting the cumulative sum of the observations, taken with 
as the origin, on a chart on which both sets of boundary lines have 
been drawn. This test does not differ from Wald's sequential test in 
that the results obtained from each observation may be sufficient to 
allow testing to be terminated. To satisfy the requirements of the 
price adjusting plans, one is not concerned with making an evaluation 
after each observation, only that sufficient observations be made to 
insure that the confidence limits can be met. 
Summary 
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that although conven­
tional sequential sampling acceptance plans are more efficient than 
conventional single sampling plans, a parallel situation does not exist 
with regard to price adjusting plans. One need only solve for a value 
of n to satisfy the producer's requirement for protection, and without 
a need for a limit on the magnitude of x the techniques of sequential 
sampling simply do not apply. Finally, it was shown that even if a 
sequential sampling price adjusting plan were possible, it would not be 
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a powerful plan since 0 can never be less than 0.5 and for common 
values of p 2 it is very close to the value of 1 - a. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRICE ADJUSTING SAMPLING PLANS 
The purpose of this chapter is to extend the work of Foster to 
include an economic analysis of a price adjusting single sampling plan. 
Included will be a development of the limits for the most likely value 
of C, the variable price per good unit. Also included will be a discus­
sion of the loss functions for both the producer and the consumer which 
would result from the employment of a price adjusting plan. 
Expected Cost Interval 
Before either the producer or the consumer should agree to the 
use of a price adjusting plan, they should have some appreciation for 
the range of values that C might assume. Conceivably, if x/n is a very 
bad estimate of the true lot fraction defective, then either the con­
sumer or the producer is going to suffer a potentially severe economic 
loss. However, if it is known prior to the signing of a final agreement 
that, for example, 99% of the time C will vary within very tight limits, 
then both the consumer and producer would be more willing to employ a 
price adjusting sampling plan. 
Specifically, in the following development, we will attempt to 
determine the areas A^ and A^ shown in Figure 10 for given values of 
P, L, and U. 
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L r u. 
Figure 10. Probability Distribution of C. 




A 1 « Pr < C > U 
A 2 - P r f c < LJ 
so that the interval can be expressed as, 
(27) P r < L < C < U ) « l - A 1 - A 2 
The development will in general follow the logic used by Hald 
(14) in his preliminary work leading to the development of the compound 
hypergeometric distribution. 




Lx - Pr |x < nkx(p#)j 
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Expression (28) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) 
of x. To find an expression for the cdf, Hald in his development first 
derives the marginal distribution of x, i.e., the over-all or average 
probability of x defectives in the sample as, 
(29) g n(x) « £p(X,x) - £ pfx | x j f N(X) 
X x ^ J 
where 
p^X,x is the simultaneous distribution of X defectives in 
the lot and x in the sample, f N(X) is the probability distribu­
tion of X defectives in a lot of size N, 
and 
p * s t n e probability of getting x defectives in the 
sample given that there are X in the lot. 
In the problem with which we are concerned, it is more logical 
to think of the prior distribution of p 1 , the true lot fraction defec­
tive, than of X, the actual number of defectives in the lot. Therefore, 
we shall rewrite (29) substituting p f for X; this substitution produces, 
(30) g n(x) « £ p(p,x) -][ p|x|pA f N(p») 
P f P* ^ J 
The cumulative distribution may now be written as, 
(31) A x - Pr |x < nk 1(p ,)| - £ 
^ J x«0 
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x«0 p • 
At t h i 6 point, we shall modify Hald's development further by 
making the usual assumption that n/N is sufficiently small that the 
distribution of x may be adequately described by the binomial proba­
bility distribution. 
Hence, (31) becomes, 
(32) A x * Pr jx < nk^p') ) « 
[nkitp')] J 
I I L(NX) P'X(1 - P ' ) n " X fM(p')] 
x-0 P* 
Similarly, Expression (26) becomes, 
(33) A 2 « Pr| x > nk 2(p*) « 1 - Pr J x < nk^p'U 
Ink2(p1)] 1 J 
- 1 - I I ^ P , X ' 1 - P , ) n " % ' P ' ) ] 
x-0 p* 
where 
k2(p'> • [1 - - P')] 
Example 
To illustrate the concept of this section, it will be applied 
to the example used in Chapter III to illustrate the producer protec­
tion plan. The specifications for this problem are, 
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U « 0.225 
P * 0.2083 
L - 0.18 
p x * 0.04 
p 0 * 0.08 
These specifications require that a sample of size n * 18 be taken from 
the lot. One additional assumption will have to be made regarding the 
nature of fjq(p'). Let us assume that when the process is in control 
p' » 0.04 and that based on historical data, this has been the case 80% 
of the time. We shall use the symbol w^, i * 1,2, to denote a weighting 
factor; hence, w^ « 0.80. When the process is out of control, p* *0.08 
and w 2 * 0.20. 
First, we shall solve for A . , using Equation (32). 
[nkjCp')] 
- I I KV x <x - P « ) n _ , Vp ' ) ] 
x=0 p 
t n k ^ p ' ) ] 
where, 
f N(p x) « w x « 0.80 
* N ( p 2 ) * w 2 * 0 , 2 0 




Ne note tha t k^(p^) i s n e g a t i v e . I f we wr i t e in a more 
s imp l i f i ed form* i t w i l l be e a s i e r to see the cause and meaning of t h i s 
nega t ive v a l u e . 
A x «Pr̂ x/n<k1(p1)j. PrjV«PlJ + Pr̂ x/n<k1(p2)J • P r ^ ) * - p ^ | 
The va lue for k^(p^) i s nega t ive because the p roducer ' s choice of U i s so 
l a r g e and p^ so small tha t ~| ( l - p^) > 1. The meaning of t h i s r e s u l t 
i s tha t Pr fx/n < k1(p1)J * 0 s ince the p r o b a b i l i t y i s zero tha t the 
f r ac t i on d e f e c t i v e w i l l be n e g a t i v e . I f U was ass igned a va lue such that 
U < ^ - p ) "then k^(p^) would be p o s i t i v e and Pr ^ x / n < k̂Cp̂ ĵ would 
be non-zero . 
I f the consumer chooses a va lue of U such tha t 
u>ir̂ r 
then k ^ ( p 2 ) w i l l be n e g a t i v e , and of n e c e s s i t y k^(p^) w i l l a l s o be 
n e g a t i v e . 
Note tha t s ince 
p 2 > pa 
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P P and if U < j , then U must also be less than (̂  p ^ • 
Hence, if k 1(p 2) < 0 then k-^p^ < 0. 
If k^(p2) is negative, then * 0. 
Hence from Equation (25), 
Pr < C > U \ * 0 . 
k J 
which means the consumer is going to have perfect protection no matter 
what value of n is dictated by a producer protection plan. This condi­
tion is discussed in more detail in Chapter VI. 
Returning to the example, since k^(p^) < 0, 
Pr ĵx/n < oj » 0 
Therefore, 
K/n < k 1(p 2)^| • Pr |p' « p. ^1 * P r { X' " ̂  ' V1* F2 / J 1 M ^ F ~~ F 2 / 
« Pr fx < (18)(0.0064)J • (0.20) 
* 0.0446 
Using Equation (33) we will now evaluate A 2 in a similar manner 
to that used above. 
[»k,(Pl)] 
A 2 
w "-o ^1 J 
1 - I [( 1x 8)(0.04) x(0.96) 1 8' X] (0,80) -
x-0 
[nk^(p2)] 







2 < P 2 > - t 1 - & ^ - ° - 0 8 ) 1 
- 0.205 
Hence, 
A 2«Prj^x/n_lc 2( P l)j • Pr(p•« P l) +Pr ̂ x/n _k 2(p 2)J • Pr(p'-p 2) 
-Pr jVn £ (18)(0.171)J (0.80) + Prj^x > (l8)(0.205)j (0.20) 
*(0.005)(0.80) + (0.05059)(0.20) 
-0.014 
Consequently, an evaluation of Equation (27) becomes 
Pr jj).18 < C < 0.225^- 1 - 0.0446 - 0.014 
- 0.94 
This tells the producer and the consumer that for the parameters 
given at the beginning of this example, if a sample of 18 items is 
inspected, that 94% of the time the actual price paid per good unit will 
be in the range $0.18 to $0,225, which are limits roughly plus and minus 
10% of the desired value, P. 
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In a similar manner, a second expected cost interval could be 
developed using the sample size specified for the consumer protection plan. 
Since in that plan n * 36, one would expect that Pr jL < C < UJ would be 
greater than for the plan with n * 18, and it is. The procedure is 
nearly identical to that already presented so only the results will be 
given. If the consumer protection plan is used, 
Pr ̂ 0.18 < C < 0.225 > - 0.9936 
Producer and Consumer Loss Functions 
Linked directly to the spectrum of values that C is likely to 
assume is the concept of a producer's and a consumer's loss function. 
The losses, as will be shown in the following development, depend directly 
on the accuracy with which x/n estimates p* the true lot fraction defec­
tive. The producer will lose money if it happens that C < P, i.e., if 
C « P ( f — ^ ) < P 1 - p f 
i - p 1 
1 - x/n < 1 - p' 
or if, 
x/n > p' 
The producer expects that if the plan works perfectly, i.e., 
x/n * p f, he will theoretically receive for his lot of N items the fol­
lowing total payment, 
P T o t . l - W l l - P ' ) . 
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However, since payment is made on the basis of a sampling plan 
he will actually receive, 
P T o t a l - HPU - Vn) 
The producer has already specified the lower limit L on C that 
he is willing to tolerate, but to enhance his appreciation of the impact 
that employing a price adjusting plan will have on his business, he 
should have some appreciation for the total loss on the lot that he may 
have to absorb. An expression for the producer's loss function can be 
developed as follows. 
Loss * Theoretical P T . , - Actual P T . , 
Total Total 
« NP(l - p») - NP(l - x/n) 
« NP(l - p* - 1 + x/n) 
* NP(x/n - p') 
Consistent with the earlier discussions which were concerned 
with protecting the producer against losses per good unit that would 
occur when C < L, the producer's loss function will consider only posi­
tive losses. That is, we will assume that the producer is not as con­
cerned with the magnitude of possible profits (negative losses) as he is 
with the likelihood of potentially ruinous losses. This means that we 
can write 
r 
LOSS « NP(x/n - p') x/n > P* 
0 otherwise 
We know from the development in Chapter III that the producer's 
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protection is stated as follows. 
Prfc < L | p» < pxi < 
This can be translated into a loss function at quality level 
p* * p^ as follows, 
(34) Pr ̂ Loss/good unit > P-L [ p» * P ^ < <* 
and 
(35) Pr jjotal Lot Loss > (P-L)N(l-p1)^| < a 
We note that Expression (35) actually represents the total loss 
on good units in the lot because the loss per good unit is multiplied 
by the total number of good units in the lot when p* * p^. This can be 
equated to total lot loss because there is no loss associated with defec­
tive items since nothing is paid for them. 
Using the data from previous examples in this chapter and Chapter 
III, we have 
a « 0.01 
P - $0.2083 
L « $0.18 
Assume a lot size, N - 1,000 
P 1 - 0.04, w 1 * 0.80 
p 2 • 0.08, w 2 « 0.20 
Therefore, Expression (35) would be evaluated as, 
Pr JTotal Lot Loss > (0.2083 - 0.18)(l,000) (l -0.04)̂j < 0.01 
Pr (Total Lot Loss > $27.17̂1 < 0.01 
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In the long run, the producer can expect to receive an amount 
for the lot based on the expected value of x/n. 
From the prior distribution of p f , we get 
E[P'] * Pj^j + P 2 W 2 * (0«04)(0«80) +(0.08)(0.20) -0.048 
PTotal - N P ^ - E tpJ]) 
* 1,000 $0.2083)(l -0.048) 
« $198.30 
Hence, based upon the expected total price for the lot, there is 
^27 17 
no more than a 1% chance of losing more than I * • or 13.7% on any 
transaction; in fact, with a sample size of 18, the risk of a 13.7% loss 
is actually 0.5%. 
A similar analysis of a consumer protection plan can be developed. 
Define consumer loss as, 
(36) LOSS - INP( p' - x/n), p 1 > x/n 
0 otherwise 
Using the consumer protection plan developed in Chapter III we have 
Prj^C > U|p'-p 2 j < p 
The loss per good unit is then, 
(37) Pr ̂ Loss/Good Unit > U -P | p« « p 2 J < 0 
and the total lot loss is 
(38) Pr fTotal Lot Loss > (U -P)(N)(l -pjl < 0 
46 
Using the same data with U * 0.225. we get 
Pr /lotal Lot Loss > (0.225 -0.2083)(1,000)(l -0.08)j < 0.05 
Pr f Total Lot Loss > $15.36̂j < 0.05 
This means that there is no more than a 5% chance that the con­
sumer will lose (i.e., pay an excessive price) more than $15.36/$198.30 
or 7,7% on any transaction. 
Impact of the Producer Protection Plan on the Consumer 
In Chapter III a PASS plan was designed which protected the pro­
ducer. The plan stipulated that a sample of size n be taken from the lot 
and NP(l -x/n) be paid for the lot. The statement is made in that chapter 
that the consumer is agreeable to the plan because he (l) agreed to the 
indifference curve and (2) he agreed to accept a plan intended to pro­
tect the producer. However, he might want to inspect more than n items 
particularly if as a result of such a plan he suffers potential losses 
by not having Pr jjC > U | p* "P̂j ̂e *es tnan 0 " t n e a m o u n t he desires. 
Of course, if as a result of the producer protection plan, the consumer 
already is protected with regard to the upper limit on C, then he would 
have no need to sample further. Let us assume that Pr Tc > U | p * *p^j 
is not less than 0. Further, let us assume that the consumer must absorb 
a cost of sampling C , which may be represented by 
s 
(39) C s - c Q + c xn 
That is, there is a fixed set-up cost, perhaps the time required by the 
inspector to set up his testing equipment, and in addition a cost per 
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item inspected. If by inspecting more than the prescribed number, n, 
the consumer can more than recoup his inspection costs by reducing the 
expected losses associated with Pr > U |p* "p^^j • then it would be 
prudent for him to do so. The expression which represents his savings is, 
Savings * (Loss if n « n Q ) • Pr^Loss | n * noj 
- (Loss if n^n^) • Pr^Loss | n * n ^ 
J 
where n. > n . 
1 o 
We note from the development of Expression (38) that the magnitude of 
the loss, as defined, is independent of n. Hence, savings becomes, 
(40) Savings * (Loss) I Pr(Loss | n *n ) -Pr(Loss n - n x )J 
If Savings is greater than ^ ( ^ ~n Q) then the additional inspec­
tion should be performed. Note that the fixed cost, C q , drops out since 
once the inspector is set up, the only additional cost associated with 
inspecting a few more items is the variable cost. 
Example 
In the example of the producer protection plan in Chapter III, 
the parameters of the plan dictate that n*18. We know from an evalua­
tion of Expression (38) that we are concerned with the total lot loss 
being greater than (U-P)(N)(l -p^) which, when evaluated is $15.36. Next, 
we must evaluate 
Pr J Loss I n *n I where n * 18 
I °j ° 
Referring to the development of (38) we see that 
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Pr I Loss | n - n Q I » p r ' C > U | p' - p 2 > n -18} 
from expression (13) this becomes, 
- Pr ĵx/n > 1 -U/P(l -p2)j 
evaluating, using the same parameters as in Chapter III, we get 
Pr < x > (18)(0.0064)^ 
Pr Jx > 0.115 | n M S , p' *0.08 
0.7-H06 
The next task is to search the cumulative tables of the binomial 
distribution for a minimum value of n which will satisfy the consumer's 
risk without violating the producer's protection. For this example n*36, 
which is the solution to the consumer protection problem of Chapter III, 
is sufficiently large that it more than guarantees the desired producer 
protection. Hence, 
Pr (Loss | n * 36 j * Pr |x < (36) (0.0064) ) 
« 0.0497 
Therefore evaluating Savings we get, 
Savings - $15,36(0.77706 - 0.0497) 
- $11.15 
If $11.15 is less than c x(36 - 18). such as would be the case 
if c^ « $1.00 per item, then the additional samples should not be taken. 
The consumer cannot reap any additional benefits by further sampling. 
However, if 18 c^ < $11.15, the consumer should inspect an additional 
18 items and enjoy additional savings. 
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CHAPTER V 
EFFECT OF TIGHTENED LINEAR INDIFFERENCE 
Early in Chapter III it was mentioned that the linear indiffer­
ence curve could be the curve shown in Figure 11. 
Lot Price 
( 4 1 ) 
> P' 
Figure 11. Linear Indifference Curve (a < l). 
This curve is described by the equation 
("' 
Lot Price « JNP(l - p'/a) 0 < p' < a, 0 < a < 1 
otherwise 
All of the development up to this point has assumed that a*1.0, 
meaning that the indifference curve intercepts the abscissa at p* * 1.0. 
With 0 < a < 1 the pricing scheme is dramatically altered. With this new 
definition for Lot Price, the new expression for P j o t a ^ becomes, 
(42) P" Total NP[1 - x/an] , (l - x/an) > 0, 0 < a < 1 
0 otherwise 
The development of (42) will be omitted since it parallels very closely 
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the evolution of Equation (7) from Equation (2). 
The practical meaning of (42) is that so long as x/n < a, the 
consumer will accept the lot and pay an amount less than would be paid 
using the plan developed earlier, but if x/n > a, then the consumer 
will accept the lot but pay nothing for it. The difference between 
the amount paid for the lot under both plans can be readily evaluated. 
(43) Difference * NP(l - x/n) - NP(l - x/an) 
»(NP x/an)(l - a) 
Using this kind of tightened indifference curve, the consumer would 
first identify p^. p 2* and then choose a such that p 2 < a < 1. 
The introduction of a value for a less than 1.0 not only affects 
the total price per lot, it also affects C, the actual price paid per 
good unit. 
Recall that, 
c „ M Total Price paid for the Lot 
Actual number of good units in the lot 
We use the double-prime notation to differentiate between the two 
expressions for actual price per good unit. 
c„ » NP(1 -x/anj 
N(l -p') 
(44) C« « P (\"ffi°) 
In the earlier analysis, E[C] • P. However, now, 
E[C] . H±f^-) - ( P / A ) ( f ^ ) 
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which means that as p' increases toward a, the producer can expect not 
only to receive less for the total lot, but he can also expect to be 
penalized further for bad quality in that he actually receives less per 
good unit. When, 
p* • a 
E[C] * 0 
Although having a < 1 acts to severely penalize the producer 
when p* approaches a, the parameters of the problem can be modified so 
that the producer will have an incentive to produce lots with p' < p^. 
As a starting point, a new value for price per good unit will have to be 
chosen such that the expected value of the total lot price when p' * p^, 
will be equal to the total amount the producer would normally receive 
using a conventional plan. This concept can be best illustrated by work­
ing an example. The following parameters will be used, 
N * 1,000 
P l * 0.04 
P 2 « 0.08 
a « 0.70 
Basic price per unit using a conventional plan 
* $0.20 per each unit 
We shall first solve first solve for P" the new price per good unit. 
Expected total lot price under conventional plan • $0.20N 
« $200.00 
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Et P Total I P ' -P X1 - N P - U - P j / . ) 
-i.ooop-d -g$) 
* 943P" 
Equating the two expressions for lot price evaluated at the base 
point Pj, we get, 
P " m 943 " $ 0 - 2 1 2 1 
Note the following schedule of payments which clearly shows the incentive 
for good quality and penalty for bad. 
E [ P » Q t a l |p* * 0] « $212.10 (6% over base price) 
E[P!Jotal |p' * 0.04] « $200.00 (base price -
also same value as for earlier PASP plan 
with a * 1.0) 
E [ P £ o t a l |p' * 0.08] « $187.90 (6% penalty for 
bad quality) 
£ [ P f o t , l IP ' - « ] " ° 
The next question is how large must the sample size be to provide the 
producer the protection he desires. Assume, 
L * $0.19 (10% less than P") 
a - 0.01 
Using the usual procedure 
P r f C < I 
I 
C" is evaluated using Equation (44) and we get, 
I P' _ PXJ < a 
5 3 
Pr |x/n > • [ 1 - P R ( 1 - P X ) ] j < « 
Evaluating gives, 
Pr |̂ x/n > 0 . 0 9 5 2 J < 0 . 0 1 
which requires n * 7 4 . 
We note that the tightened indifference curve with a * 0 . 7 0 has 
greatly increased the sample size compared with the earlier plan which 
had a * 1 . 0 . In the earlier example however, a value of L • $ 0 . 1 8 was 
used which is not exactly 1 0 % less than P « $ 0 . 2 0 8 3 . To more accurately 
demonstrate the impact that varying a has on n, a series of tabulated 
values is shown in Table 1 which uses a constant ratio L/P" « 0 . 9 0 . 
In order to protect the producer when he submits good quality 
(p' * pj), he should expect to receive the same amount no matter how a 
varies. Therefore, for each value of a, unique values of P" and L will 
have to be computed. 
The relationship for computing P n results from equating the 
expected payment from a conventional plan and the payment using a plan 
with a < 1 . 0 . Using the available data, N * $ 1 , 0 0 0 , price * $ 0 . 2 0 for 
a conventional plan this becomes, 
Expected Total Payment 
Using Conventional Plan * E[P" | p 1 * pl ] 
( $ 0 . 2 0 ) ( N ) « N P » ( 1 - P l/a) 
or, 
p n $ 0 . 2 0 
[ 1 - 2 * 2 4 ] 
L a J 
Table 1. Comparison of Plans for a < 1.0. 
a P" L k xa n -0.01 
a 
n -0.025 n 
a a 
-0.030 
1.0 0.2083 0.1875 0.1360 30 6 6 
0.90 0.2093 0.1884 0.1223 33 25 17 
0.85 0.2099 0.1889 0.1156 44 26 26 
0.80 0.2105 0.1895 0.1088 56 28 28 
0.75 0.2113 0.1902 0.1020 60 40 40 
0.70 0.2121 0.1909 0.0952 74 53 42 
0.65 0.2131 0.1918 0.0884 102 68 57 
0.60 0.2143 0.1929 0.0816 135 86 74 
0.55 0.2157 0.1941 0.0748 190 135 122 
0.50 0.2174 0.1957 0.0680 280 230 180 
0.45 0.2195 0.1976 0.0612 NOTE i 
0.40 0.2222 0.2000 0.0544 Pr, ( x/n _ k a 1 < a 
0.35 0.2258 0.2032 0.0476 where I J 
0.30 0.2308 0.2077 0.0408 
ki - 1 - "̂ T (1 - P l ) 
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and hence 
L - 0.90 P" 
Looking at Table 1, we draw two rather interesting conclusions, 
(l) As the value of (ak^) in the expression 
Pr |x/n > 
approaches p* (which is evaluated at 0.04) the sample size 
increases without bound. This results from the fact that 
as (ak.) approaches p. from the positive side, n must tend 
toward infinity to insure that Pr ̂ x/n > (ak^)J < a. 
(2) As the value of a is increased, the sample size is gener­
ally reduced. The value of n does not always decrease for 
an incremental increase in a because of the discrete nature 
of x. It is of interest to note that when a p^, then no 
matter what values a assumes (as long as ak^ > p^) then 
n * 1. The proof of this is located in the Appendix. 
To answer the obvious question of how the consumer chooses a value 
for a, one approach which will aid the consumer in arriving at a decision 
involves looking at how the increase in sampling costs are offset by 
the reduction in the expected payment for the total lot. This analysis 
can best be demonstrated by working an example. We will use the same 
2-point binomial for p' as has been used earlier. Recall that 
Pr { p* « p 1 } - 0.80 
Pr Jp* » P O I - 0.20 
Let the increase in sampling costs equal. 
AC « c. (n„ . , ~ - n . rt) s 1 a <1.0 a *1.0 
The expected reduction, R(a), can be identified as, 
R(a) - (Reduction | p' * p1) Pr ̂ p' » p ^ + 
(Reduction | p 1 * p 2) Pr ^p' » p 2 ^ 
The decision will be to reduce a so that |AC -R(a)| < e where e i 
some tolerable difference necessitated by the discrete nature of the 
binomial variable. 
From the decision to use p^, the acceptable quality level, as 
pivot point, 
(Reduction | p 1 * p 1 ) * 0 
therefore, for the 2-point binomial case, 
R(a) * (Reduction | p' * P 2) Pr^p' " P^} 
To find a minimum value for |ACg - R(a)|, a trial and error 
method will be used. 
(Reduction | p' * p 2) - K^oUl I P 1 - P2> a * 1.0] -
P T o t a l IP* * P 2 ' « -0.90] 
" ( N P a M . 0 > ( l " ( N P a - 0 . 9 0 ^ ( 1 ^ 
The values for P M are obtained from Table 1. 
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(Reduction | p 1 * p 2) - (l,000)(0.2083)(l - 0.08) -
(1,000) (0.2093) (1 - £ S S ) 
- $1.94 
Therefore, 
R(a) - ($1.94) Pr |p* - pjj * ($1.94) (0.20) 
« $0.39 
Since n n o n * 33 and n . n • 30, the additional sampling a * 0.90 8*1.0 
costs are 3c^. If c^ < $0.13 per item, then a * 0.90 would be a logical 
choice based on purely economic considerations. However, other factors 
which can not be readily quantified may affect the consumer's decision 
on a value for a. For example, the consumer may experience severe work 
stoppages if the product he is buying is used on an assembly line and 
p' > 0.50. He may then choose a * 0.50 especially if his per item 
sampling cost, c^, is small. Additionally, the consumer may want to 
absorb the higher sampling costs associated with a smaller value of a 
if he would like to encourage the producer to improve his production 
process so as to reduce the lot fraction defective below p^. Table 2 
shows the total payment for a lot of 1,000 items if p' * 0 . 
In summary, it has been the purpose of this chapter to show that 
by allowing a to assume values less than one the consumer increases his 
flexibility in arriving at a payment plan. With a < 1.0 the consumer 
has the capability to more severely penalize the producer for bad quality 
while simultaneously furnishing him with an incentive to improve the 
quality of his process. The producer, on the other hand, may or may not 
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Table 2. Payment Schedule Corresponding 
To Decreasing Values of a. 
a if D * « 0 Bonus* 
1.0 $208.30 4.15% 
0.9 209.30 4.65 
0.85 209.90 4.95 
0.80 210.50 5.25 
0.75 211.30 5.65 
0.70 212.10 6.05 
0.65 213.10 6.51 
0.60 214,30 7,15 
0.55 215.70 7.85 
0.50 217.40 8.70 
Bonus is computed with regard to the base price of $200.00 paid 
when p' mp->t "the acceptable quality level. 
be willing to accept a plan with a < 1.0. If he has reason to believe 
that he can reduce his fraction defective below p^, then he would be 
eager to accept the plan because of the additional revenue it would 
provide as compared with a plan using a * 1.0. However, even though he 
is assured by the new plan that 
Pr jcM < L | p' « P lJ < a 
he may hesitate to accept it if he fears his fraction defective may 
increase beyond p. • 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the material pre­
sented in the preceding chapters. The advantages and disadvantages of 
price adjusting sampling plans will be reviewed with particular emphasis 
placed on the practical problems that this type of plan presents. The 
price adjusting plan with a < 1.0 provides such a unique combination 
of rewards and penalties for the producer that this type of plan will 
be recapitulated separately. Finally, recommendations will be made for 
possible future research dealing with the problem of minimizing the com­
bination of potential losses and the cost of sampling to reduce those 
losses. 
The Producer and Consumer Protection Plans 
With both the producer and the consumer protection plans there is 
a direct correlation between p' and the sample size necessary to provide 
the desired protection. For example, with regard to the producer protec­
tion plan, with a fixed value for ~ , n decreases as p' decreases. This 
results from the fact that a reduction in p 1 reduces the variance of x/n 
which is equal to p*(l - p*)/n. Hence, with a reduced variance fewer 
observations are necessary to insure the desired protection. 
For a fixed value of p' there is also a correlation between the 
ratio L/P and n. 
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V*e can see from Expression (ll), 
Pr | vn > 1 - f (1 - p')J < a , 
that as jj 1, [ l - j j ( l - p ' ) ] -+*p*. 
Expression (ll) then approaches 
Pr ̂ x/n _ p 'J < a . 
For any value of p' 
Pr |x/n > p'J * 0.50. 
L 
Since a is much less than 0.50, the sample size n °° as ^ — > 1. 
An interesting situation can arise with the consumer protection 
plan that can not arise with the producer protection plan and that is the 
case where no observations need be taken. If we look at Expression (13) 
Pr |x/n > 1 - ~(1 - p 2)J>. 1 -0 
we see that 
[1 - (l - p 2)] can be non-positive, 
If, 
1 - £ (1 - p 2 ) < 0 
it means that if 
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then no observation need be taken since, 
Pr jx/n > (fj - 1 
This may also be interpreted as indicating that the consumer is guar­
anteed perfect protection. 
As outlined by Foster (12) and Foster and Perry (13), there are 
a number of advantages and disadvantages to price adjusting sampling 
plans. The advantages include! 
(a) Price adjusting sampling eliminates the costs associated 
with rejected lots. 
(b) The time lost between rejecting one lot and the reception 
of its replacement is avoided. 
(c) Since the consumer is indifferent to quality he need not 
maintain representatives at the producer's facility to 
insure that good quality is produced, as is often done with 
government contracts. 
(d) An incentive to produce good quality is built into a 
price adjusting sampling plan. If p' « 0, p j o t a i *NP> 
whereas if p' « 1.0, p j o t a i * 0, 
Further incentives are added when a plan with a < 1.0 is 
used, but that will be discussed in more detail later in 
this chapter. 
Price adjusting sampling plans, despite their many advantages have 
some very real disadvantages. Included among them are, 
(a) The difficulty that would be encountered in trying to con­
vince a producer and consumer to accept a plan which bases 
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payment on expected value concepts. This also will be 
discussed in detail in this chapter, 
(b) Since total lot price depends on the number of defectives 
found in a sample, some difficulty might be encountered in 
insuring that the inspection results are fair. 
Although it could not be considered a disadvantage, certainly it 
is a disappointment that it isn't possible to combine the economics of 
item-by-item sequential sampling with the many advantages of price adjust­
ing sampling. 
To summarize that analysis, the reason that sequential sampling 
can not be applied to price adjusting sampling is that to insure 
requires that x/n, the unbiased estimator of p', the true fraction 
defective, be more or less than some fraction. To meet the specifica-
minimum size can be calculated prior to taking any observations. Hence, 
there is no need to determine the number of defectives accumulated after 
each observation. Ergo, there is no need for sequential sampling. 
The purpose of Chapter IV was to demonstrate that before the 
producer and the consumer agree to a price adjusting plan, they can be 
furnished relatively complete information on the economic risks involved. 
or 
tion for x/n merely requires that n be of some minimum size, and this 
The Economics of Price Adjusting Sampling Plans 
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The actual implementation of a PASP might work as follows. The con­
sumer would specify N and p^, what he considers a good level of quality. 
Bids submitted by vendors would specify P, L, and a. The consumer would 
look at each set ĵ P, L, and compute the sample size n necessary to 
give each vendor his desired protection. Next, for each value of n, 
he would determine the level of protection he would receive vis-a-vis U, 
his upper limit on C. He would then award a contract based on an over­
all evaluation of the following criteriai 
(a) P, price per good unit 
(b) The sample size necessary to give the producer his desired 
protection, (recall that variable cost of sampling is c^n) 
(c) The impact that taking a sample of n would have on the con­
sumer's desired protection. 
One of the problems that could arise with a plan that bases pay­
ment on the results of a sampling inspection is that either the producer 
or the consumer or both may need to know what the payment will be prior 
to the sampling inspection. Suppose for example that Consumer B buys 
metal parts for his product from Vendor A. Before Consumer B can quote 
a price on his product he must know what the cost of his metal components 
will be. This is easily handled if Consumer B and Vendor A expect to 
continue doing business for more than just one transaction. The price 
that Consumer B pays is NP(l - p) where p i s based on Vendor A's process 
average. In the example of Chapter IV this would be 
P * p l w l + P2 W2 
Should it happen that NP(l - p) > NP(l - x/n) then the amount paid for 
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the next lot (again prior to inspection sampling) is NP(l - p) minus 
the overpayment from the previous transaction. Similarly, if 
NP(l - p) > NP(l - x/n) the payment for the next lot would be increased 
by the amount of the underpayment. Whenever Consumer B decides to stop 
buying from Vendor A, the minor difference could finally be transferred 
from one to the other. 
Price Adjusting Sampling Plans with a < 1.0 
As was mentioned in Chapter V, a price adjusting plan with a<1.0 
has considerable appeal to the consumer. Recalling that the plan with 
a * 1.0 and the one with a<1.0 were designed so that at p' * P^ 
expected total lot payments were equal, the schedule of payments shown 
in Table 3 illustrates the increased incentives and penalties possible 
when a < 1.0. 
Table 3. Schedule of Payments 
E [ p T o t a l l P ' -0] -$208.30 
(4% incentive) 
E [ P T o t a l l p ' -0.04] - $200.00 
£ [ P T o t a l l p ' "0.08] - $192.00 
£ t P T o t a l | p ' -0.70] -$125.00 
{6% incentive) 
E^ PTotal ' p ' J 5 ° ' 0 4 ^ " $200.00 
E[P» jp- -0.08] « $187.90 
E [ PTotall p' • t ° * 7 0 ] * 0 
As was mentioned in the survey of the literature, Chapter II, 
most acceptance sampling plans only penalize the producer when p' > p^, 
but provide no incentives to the producer to improve his process in 
order to reduce lot fraction defective below p.. MIL-STD-105D does offer 
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indirect incentives in that the inspection criteria may be tightened 
or reduced depending on the pattern of inspection results, but no 
direct monetary reward or penalty is possible. With price adjusting 
sampling using a < 1.0, significant rewards and penalties can be easily 
incorporated in the plan. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
In the economic analysis of price adjusting sampling plans, 
there was no attempt made to minimize the losses that the consumer and 
producer experience when p / p'. In Chapter III the loss functions were 
defined as follows, 
Producer's Loss Function! 
fw(x/n - p'), x/n > p' 
Loss * ( 
1 0 otherwise 
Consumer's Loss Function. 
fNP(p' - x/n), p' > x/n 
Loss * / 
| 0 otherwise 
From the producer's point of view, the way to minimize losses is to 
take a sample of size n * N, This will insure that p * p'. However, 
if the producer had to share the cost of sampling with the consumer, he 
would be motivated to find a sample size which minimized the combina­
tion of the total expected losses due to estimation and the total cost 
of sampling. In the latter case, a logical loss function would be, 
(45) Loss « NP | p - p' | 
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and sampling costs would be described as, 
C = C + c. n s o l 
Although (45) is a linear loss function, it might well be in 
the best interests of the producer and the consumer to use a quadratic 
loss function such as 
(46) Loss' « NP(p - p ' ) 2 
which has the advantage that it reduces the possibility of large losses 
more effectively than a linear loss function. 
The approach outlined in Raiffa and Schlaifer (16) involves find­
ing the estimate p* which will minimize the expected estimation loss 
(either linear or quadratic) as defined by either (45) or (46). Once 
the value of p* has been found, it will be used to determine first, the 
magnitude of the expected losses for a given prior distribution and sec­
ond, the value of n which will minimize the sampling costs. 
This approach is quite different from that discussed in this 
paper and is recommended for future research because it offers an 
interesting alternative. This approach offers the opportunity to deter­
mine a sample size which minimizes losses whereas Foster's approach 
identifies another value for n which provides the producer, for example, 
with a high assurance of receiving some minimum payment, L. 
It is recommended that future work in the area of price adjust­
ing sampling plans address the problem of optimizing the choice of a, 
the intercept point on the abscissa for the linear indifference curve. 
Although intangibles will affect the consumer's choice of a, if the 
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difference between the linear indifference curve and the consumer's 
convex ideal indifference curve (see Figure 12) could be interpreted 
as a loss, then perhaps some relationship could be developed involving 
the magnitude of that loss, a, the intercept and the total cost of samp­
ling n items. 
Lot Price 
Figure 12. Consumer Indifference Curves. 
Similarly, work could be done in the area of minimizing the 
comparable losses that the producer suffers when he agrees to accept 
a linear rather than a concave indifference curve. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof that for a > the sample size necessary to give the 
producer his desired protection is, n * 1. Let 
« [1 - £ (1 - P l ) ] 
Since < 1.0, a < 1.0 and p 1 < 1.0, then (ak^ < 1.0. 
Therefore, the producer protection requirement becomes for n * 1, 
Pr ĵ x/n > ak Ĵ « Prj^x ^ ak^ 
Since x is discrete, this becomes 
where [ak^] means "the largest integer contained in. M 
Since ak 1 < 1.0, [ak 1] * 0 and [ak^ + 1 * 1 
/. Pr fx ± 1 | n - 1 P" - m P X 
Therefore, if p^ < a, the producer protection requirement can be satis­
fied with a sample of n • 1. 
Q.E.D. 
The implicit meaning of this proof is that if the producer 
specifies a p^, then the plan is to take a sample of one, and (l -p^) 
of the time the producer gets a maximum payment, and p^ of the time he 
receives zero dollars for the lot. Since p^ < a, this should be accept­
able to the producer as a long range plan. 
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